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一、经济学人杂志双语文章摘要

许多有关现代历史的论述认为,是欧洲的宗教改革促进了更加个人主义、以法律为基础的思维。亨里奇则将重点放在了大约公元1000年之后的天主教世界。他认为,通过禁止近亲婚配,罗马教会开启了一个更具流动性的社会,因为人们不得不放眼更远处寻找配偶。

二、经济学人杂志双语文章中英对照翻译

Value judgments 价值判断

2020.11


Joseph Henrich’s study of WEIRD societies
约瑟夫·亨里奇对WEIRD社会的研究【《世界上最怪的人》书评】 

经济学人双语杂志

IT TAKES MORE than a decent constitution to build a democracy, as anyone who has tried to steer a country out of anarchy or tyranny can attest. And it takes more than well-turned commercial laws to make a healthy market economy. For either to happen, certain values must be widely accepted—yet defining them can be tricky.
建立民主政体需要的不仅仅是一部像样的宪法,任何曾努力带领一个国家摆脱无政府状态或暴政的人都可以证明这一点。建立健康的市场经济也不只需要简洁清晰的商业法律。要实现任一都需要社会广泛接受某些价值观,但这些价值观并不容易定义。
Joseph Henrich, a professor of human evolutionary biology at Harvard, has devised a teasing term to describe societies where rules and values have come together with benign results: Western, educated, industrialised, rich and democratic. The acronym, WEIRD, neatly makes his point that these attributes, and the mindset that goes with them, are the exception not the rule in human history.
哈佛大学的人类进化生物学教授约瑟夫·亨里奇(Joseph Henrich)创造了一个戏谑的术语来描述规则与价值观的结合产生了良性结果的社会:WEIRD,由“西方”、“受过教育”、“工业化”、“富裕”、“民主”这几个英文单词的首字母组成。这个意为“怪异”的词正好表明了他的观点——这些社会特性和相应的思维方式是人类历史上的例外,而不是常态。
The values that underpin WEIRDness, he writes, include a tough-minded belief in the rule of the law, even at the risk of personal disadvantage; an openness to experimentation in matters of scientific knowledge or social arrangements; and a willingness to trust strangers, from politicians offering new policies to potential business partners. These may not seem original insights, but Mr Henrich’s work is distinguished by the weight he places on the extended family as an obstacle to healthy individualism, and on religious norms as the determinant of family obligations. He reinforces this theme with a welter of polling data and sweeping historical arguments, mostly about medieval Europe.
他写道,支撑着WEIRD的价值观包括:坚信法治,即便可能于个人不利;对科学知识或社会组织方面的实验持开放态度;愿意信任陌生人,无论是提议新政策的政客还是潜在的商业伙伴。这些见解看起来并不新颖,但亨里奇的研究成果有其特别之处:他强调大家族是健康的个人主义的绊脚石,而宗教规范是家族义务的决定因素。他通过大量的调查数据和主要关于中世纪欧洲的笼统历史论述来强化这一主题。
As an example of kin loyalty at odds with modern thinking, Mr Henrich records the experience of democracy-builders in Afghanistan: rural folk could not grasp the idea that they might vote for somebody who was not part of their family. Just as foreign to such outlooks, he says, is the idea that crimes are treated equally regardless of the relationships involved. In medieval China, killing within the family was treated differently from killing a stranger; killing your father was a worse crime than killing a child.
亨里奇以阿富汗的民主建设者的经历为例,说明亲缘忠诚与现代思维相左:那里的乡下人无法理解投票选举的对象可以是自己家族以外的人。他说,同样让重视亲缘的人感到陌生的理念还有对犯罪行为的处置应一视同仁,无论加害者与受害方是什么关系。在中古中国,对杀害亲人与杀害陌生人的处置不同;相比杀子,弑父罪加一等。
In many accounts of modern history, it was Europe’s Protestant Reformation that catalysed a more individualist, law-based mentality. Mr Henrich’s own emphasis is on the Catholic world from about 1000 onwards. He thinks that, by banning kin-marriage, the Roman church ushered in a more fluid society where people had to look farther afield for spouses.
许多有关现代历史的论述认为,是欧洲的宗教改革促进了更加个人主义、以法律为基础的思维。亨里奇则将重点放在了大约公元1000年之后的天主教世界。他认为,通过禁止近亲婚配,罗马教会开启了一个更具流动性的社会,因为人们不得不放眼更远处寻找配偶。
Here he is not quite convincing, despite the extensive studies he adduces to argue that modern mentalities, even now, are correlated with regions of historic Catholic influence. It seems more likely that the medieval church was negotiating with, rather than moulding, a social reality which was evolving fast as cities emerged. Nor does a ban on marrying cousins imply free marital choice. It can be part of an elaborate system of communally arranged unions.
在这里他不太有说服力,尽管他引用了大量研究,论证即便到了今天现代思维与历史上受天主教影响的地区仍有关联。看起来似乎更有可能的是,中世纪教会是在向随着城市的出现而迅速演变的社会现实妥协,而非塑造了这种社会现实。禁止表亲联姻也并不意味着自由通婚。这种禁令可能是社群安排联姻的复杂系统的一部分。
Mr Henrich’s broad point about the values that underpin liberal democracy is stronger, with one big qualification. Hundreds of millions of people live neither in atomistic WEIRD-land nor in kin-obsessed pre-modern societies, but in an interesting limbo, sometimes dynamically and sometimes tragically. Think, say, of a family from a poor, remote part of south-eastern Europe, whose younger members are working and raising children in assorted European cities, while their elders keep the home fires burning in the village. An extraordinary range of roles and attitudes co-exist in three generations.
亨里奇有关支撑自由民主制的价值观的宽泛观点更站得住脚些,但被一种情形极大削弱。数以亿计的人既非生活在原子式的WEIRD土地上,也非生活在只看亲缘关系的前现代社会中,而是处于一种有趣的不确定状态,有时充满活力,有时悲情无奈。例如,想象东南欧偏远贫困地区的一个家庭,年轻人在欧洲各地的城市工作、抚育孩子,老人留在村子里守着家。迥异的角色和态度在三代人身上并存。
Or take the South Asian communities in some northern English towns, where the mores of rural Kashmir can persist even in the fourth generation of diaspora life. Tradition-bound as they are, such communities are not untouched by modern British culture. Younger generations grow up somewhere between Mr Henrich’s WEIRDness and the harsh security of a regulated rural clan. Some have fun negotiating this terrain, some swing sharply towards either individualism or conformity; a handful react to the confusion by embracing extremism. In any case, WEIRDness need not be an either-or category, whether in medieval Europe or the 21st century.
或者看看英国北部某些城镇的南亚社区,那里的克什米尔农村风俗甚至在第四代移民身上仍在延续。尽管恪守传统,这些社区并不是丝毫不受现代英国文化的影响。年轻一辈成长的环境处于亨里奇所说的WEIRD和农村家族规条的严格保护中间的某处。有人享受在这个复杂地域“探险”的乐趣,有人明显滑向个人主义或是服从规矩,也有少数人面对价值体系的混乱走向了极端主义。不管怎样,WEIRD特质都不必是非此即彼的取舍,无论是在中世纪欧洲还是在21世纪。