Navigating the storm 风暴中航行


Can the Middle East’s largest financial centre adapt to a world that is less globalised and less tolerant of tainted money?



THE DEAL to normalise relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), announced on August 13th, was a diplomatic coup. Might it be a commercial one too? Moneymen in Dubai, the UAE’s largest financial centre, are hoping to cash in on increased investment and travel between the two countries. Israelis are expected to join the hordes of well-heeled foreigners who have opened businesses or bought swanky pads in the coastal emirate.
以色列与阿联酋关系正常化的协议于8月13日公布,这是外交上的重大突破。在商业上会不会也一样呢?阿联酋最大的金融中心迪拜的金融家希望从两国之间不断增加的投资和往来中获利。预计以色列人将和其他大批富有的外国人一样,在这个沿海酋长国开办企业或购买豪华公寓。 Dubai, one of seven emirates that make up the UAE, will be glad of the custom. Its media may be full of feel-good financial stories—drooling, for instance, over the recent foundation-pouring for the world’s tallest hotel, set to rise to 82 storeys, and the unveiling of “the world’s highest infinity pool”—but closer to earth things look less impressive. Thanks to overbuilding, property prices remain far below peaks reached six years ago. Covid-19 has clobbered an economy built largely on retail and hospitality. Low oil prices have strengthened the headwinds: Dubai is not hydrocarbon-rich but its economy feeds on petrodollars.
Adding to the challenges, Dubai faces increasing international pressure to clean up its act. It has long been less than discerning about the provenance of money flowing in. Its property market is heavily stained with laundered loot. If Dubai is forced to tighten standards, that would dent business in the short term, complicating its efforts to push its way into the premier league of financial centres.
Viewed over a longer timeline, Dubai’s growth has been spectacular. In the 1950s, as the City of London was about to ride the Eurodollar boom, Dubai was little more than a fishing village, with 20,000 souls and no airport. Today it is a metropolis. Its financial centre, which first began to take off in the 1990s, is a super-regional champion, serving as a gateway for investment from and to the Middle East, South Asia and Africa. Underpinning this is its stable polity and high quality of life: it offers the region’s ritziest penthouses, finest dining and best shopping and entertainment.
Strong trade and transport links support its financial offering. The city has the world’s largest man-made harbour and the Middle East’s busiest port, with enough space for 22.4m twenty-foot containers. Its airport is—or was, at least, until the pandemic—a key east-west transit point. In 2019 it was the world’s busiest airport for international passengers. Dubai is, in short, the closest thing its region has to a Singapore- or Hong Kong-style entrepot.
According to the Global Financial Centres Index, which since 2007 has ranked cities according to a range of financial, economic and quality-of-life measures, Dubai has steadily closed the gap with the top tier (see chart 1). It now hovers just outside the top ten. The next highest Middle Eastern centre is Tel Aviv in 36th place, followed by Abu Dhabi, the capital of another emirate (and the UAE) in 39th.
根据自2007年起用金融、经济和生活质量一系列指标给城市排名的全球金融中心指数(Global Financial Centres Index),迪拜一直在稳步缩小与全球顶尖金融中心的差距(见图表1)。如今它已经在前十的门口徘徊了。中东排名第二高的金融中心特拉维夫位列第36位,在它之后另一个酋长国的首府(同时也是阿联酋的首都)阿布扎比排名第39位。
The heart of Dubai’s financial ecosystem is the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), a 110-acre “free zone” in the city centre set up in 2004 to boost Dubai as both financial waystation and investment destination. The DIFC has grown into an impressive cluster of banks, fund managers, and law and accounting firms, with over 2,500 registered companies—820 of them financial—and 25,000 professionals.
迪拜金融生态系统的心脏是迪拜国际金融中心(Dubai International Financial Centre,以下简称DIFC),这个在市中心占地110英亩的“自由区”建于2004年,目标是推动迪拜成为金融中转站和投资目的地。DIFC的发展令人瞩目,聚集了银行、基金管理公司、律师和会计师事务所,有2500多家注册公司(其中820家为金融公司)和2.5万名专业人士。
The DIFC says it hosts 17 of the world’s top 20 banks; eight of the ten leading global law firms; and six of the ten biggest asset managers. Many of them have their regional headquarters there. The banks have around $180bn of assets booked there; DIFC firms arranged an additional $99bn of lending last year. Some specialise in trade finance and infrastructure lending. The DIFC’s fund managers have assets of $424bn. Its financial firms are restricted to foreign-currency transactions. Some Dubai-based banks have operations in the zone too, but conduct dirham-denominated business from branches outside it.
The DIFC’s appeal lies largely in its bespoke tax regime and regulation. Like the other 40-odd free zones in the UAE, it sets its own rules. It is tax-light, allows foreigners full ownership (outside zones this is capped at 49%) and sets no local-hiring quotas. It has its own regulator, the Dubai Financial Services Authority, run by a former bank supervisor for America’s Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Financial firms outside free zones fall under the central bank and other national authorities.
DIFC的吸引力主要在于其特定的税收制度和法规。和阿联酋其他40多个自由区一样,它自行设定规则。这里税率低,允许外商拥有百分之百的所有权(自由区之外的外资持股上限为49%),并且不设置雇用本地员工的比例。它有自己的监管机构——迪拜金融服务管理局(Dubai Financial Services Authority),由美国货币监理署(Office of the Comptroller of the Currency)的一名前银行监管人掌管。自由区外的金融公司则由央行和其他国家主管部门监管。
The DIFC has its own judicial system too, based on common law and with courts that hear cases in English. (By contrast, the UAE’s system is based on civil law.) The DIFC passes its own laws: one on data protection, based on EU regulations, took effect on July 1st.
This autonomy is prized especially by investors whose home countries’ legal systems are less dependable. Indians flock to it because of Mumbai’s clogged, clunky and capricious courts; some joke that Dubai and Singapore are India’s real financial capitals. In a big boost, Dubai’s judgments became enforceable in India in January.
The DIFC’s judicial system has grown quickly. In 2019 its courts heard a record 952 commercial cases, 43% more than in 2018. It has a growing reputation as a regional arbitration centre, helped by a joint venture with the London Court of International Arbitration, and the hiring of judges from Australia, Britain and elsewhere.
DIFC的司法体系发展迅速。2019年,其法院审理了创纪录的952起商事案件,比2018年增加了43%。DIFC与伦敦国际仲裁法院(London Court of International Arbitration)合作成立了仲裁院,并从澳大利亚、英国等地聘请法官,推动DIFC作为区域仲裁中心的声誉不断提高。
The DIFC has navigated the coronavirus crisis well. It even managed to sign up 310 new companies in the first half of 2020—a six-month record. This followed a record year in 2019, in which 493 new companies joined, among them an insurance arm of Berkshire Hathaway and the asset-management division of State Street.
截至目前DIFC很好地扛过了新冠疫情。2020年上半年它甚至成功签约了310家新公司,创下了六个月入驻数的新纪录。2019年已经是创纪录的一年,当时有493家新公司入驻,其中包括伯克希尔•哈撒韦(Berkshire Hathaway)旗下的保险公司和道富银行(State Street)的资产管理公司。
This unlikely growth was, the DIFC says, largely driven by interest from Asian firms and fintechs. Having invested heavily to launch a fintech “accelerator”, Dubai claims to be home to over half of all fintechs in the Middle East and North Africa. The January-June registration numbers were probably helped by a speedily assembled relief package for DIFC clients, unveiled in March, including licensing-fee waivers, lease-payment deferrals as well as three-month rent forgiveness for retailers.
Still, covid-19 has taken a heavy toll on Dubai. It is more vulnerable than the region’s other economies because of its reliance on retail and recreation, both highly susceptible to physical-distancing and travel restrictions, says Ehsan Khoman, head of Middle East research at MUFG, a bank. Its equity market has fallen further than others in the Gulf this year (see chart 2).
但疫情毕竟还是给迪拜带来了严重损失。三菱日联金融集团(MUFG)中东研究负责人埃桑•霍曼(Ehsan Khoman)表示,迪拜依赖极易受社交疏离和旅行限制影响的零售和休闲娱乐业,因此比该地区的其他经济体更容易受到冲击。今年,迪拜股票市场的跌幅超过了海湾地区的其他市场(见图表2)。 
Moreover, Dubai was struggling to shake off several pre-existing conditions when the virus struck. A debt and building binge had left it exposed during the financial crisis of 2007-09. It took a $10bn bail-out by Abu Dhabi to stave off the threat of sovereign default. But Dubai’s “government-related entities” (GREs)—conglomerates with tentacles across the economy, such as Dubai World (from ports to leisure) and Dubai Holding (telecoms, property and more)—remain heavily burdened, and there is talk of another debt crisis. Capital Economics, a consultancy, reckons total public debt is $153bn, of which GREs owe $89bn, equivalent to 140% and 81% of GDP respectively. Their repayment schedule is gruelling, with over 60% of their debt due in the next four years. They had topped up their borrowing to fund projects ahead of the World Expo, which had been scheduled for October, hoping for a flurry of deals and up to 25m visitors. But the event has been pushed back a year because of covid-19.
此外,新冠病毒来袭时,迪拜正在努力摆脱一些原有的问题。先前的一轮借贷和建设狂潮让它在2007至2009年金融危机来袭时遭受重创,靠阿布扎比提供的100亿美元援助才渡过了主权债务违约的危机。但是,触角延伸至迪拜经济的各个方面、被称为“政府相关实体”(GRE)的企业集团仍然背负沉重债务,例如迪拜世界(Dubai World,业务横跨港口、休闲业等)和迪拜控股(Dubai Holding,业务包括电信、房地产等)。人们议论着又一次债务危机的可能性。咨询公司凯投宏观(Capital Economics)估计,迪拜的公共债务总计为1530亿美元,其中GRE的债务为890亿美元,分别相当于GDP的140%和81%。偿还期限紧迫,超过60%的债务将在未来四年到期。为了在原定于10月举行的世博会之前为项目提供资金,迪拜追加了贷款,本来希望世博会能达成一系列协议并吸引多达2500万游客。但由于疫情爆发,世博会被推迟一年。
Dubai’s property market, too, was in pain well before the pandemic because of oversupply. Residential property prices have fallen in recent years, as have occupancy rates at hotels (see chart 3). The number of visitors to Dubai from elsewhere in the Gulf fell by 10% between 2016 and 2019. Developers were cutting back before the virus; now some fear for their survival. In July S&P, a rating agency, downgraded the debt of two of Dubai’s biggest property companies to junk. It also expects the economy to shrink by 11% this year.
As it seeks to shake off these ailments and recover from the effects of its covid-induced lockdown (which was among the world’s strictest), Dubai faces longer-term challenges. One is the slowing and possible reversal of globalisation as trade tensions rise and populist policies spread. Having redesigned its economy around the flow of people, goods and capital, Dubai was a big beneficiary of globalisation, and used its strategic location to punch above its weight. Now the model looks like a vulnerability. (The consequences are not clear-cut, though. Entrepots sometimes benefit when big powers squabble, as dealmaking moves to neutral ground. And if global trade turns more parochial, then regional hubs like Dubai could pick up some types of business even as they lose others.)
Protracted weakness in the oil price could also cause problems. Oil-related activities make up just 1% of Dubai’s nominal GDP, according to MUFG. Still, its prospects are entwined with oil-price fluctuations. A lot of the finance in Dubai involves reinvesting oil money from the region. Its property boom was largely built on regional petrodollars. And many of its tourists come from oilier Gulf countries.
Another question is whether Dubai can stay ahead of regional rivals that covet its crown. Oil-rich Abu Dhabi, a 90-minute drive away, is a frenemy: it is both a source of bail-outs and a would-be usurper. It attracts a smattering of foreign investment managers, keen to work with its sovereign-wealth fund, the UAE’s biggest. But its financial district is not a patch on the DIFC.
Riyadh could prove a more serious competitor, especially if Saudi Arabia’s social liberalisation continues and attracts more fun-loving expats. The completion of the 59-tower King Abdullah Financial District, a banking hub in the Saudi capital, has taken on more urgency under Muhammad bin Salman, the country’s crown prince. Hints have been dropped that foreign banks that open an outpost there may be better placed to win Saudi mandates, says one banker.
利雅得可能会是一个更有力的竞争者,尤其是如果沙特阿拉伯社会能继续自由化进程、吸引到更多爱玩乐的外国人的话。沙特首都的银行业中心阿卜杜拉国王金融区(King Abdullah Financial District)将有59栋高楼,在王储穆罕默德•本•萨勒曼(Muhammad bin Salman)的领导下其落成变得更加急迫。沙特已经给出暗示,在那里开设分行的外国银行可能更容易得到政府授权项目,一位银行人士说。
The biggest long-term threat, however, comes from within: Dubai’s attitude to corrupt capital. Of all the big global financial centres, it is the shadiest—not only a haven for clean money seeking investments or fleeing turmoil elsewhere, but also for the dirty stuff. It is used by kleptocrats, money-launderers, arms-smugglers, sanctions-busters and other criminals. The UAE and Iran are the only Gulf countries on America’s list of “major money-laundering jurisdictions”; its moneymen are under scrutiny for suspected financial ties to Syria’s president and his cronies. And it doesn’t just take the bad guys’ money; a flock of fugitives, alleged fraudsters and disgraced public figures live in Dubai, including a suspect in the massive “cum-ex” tax-fraud case (who denies wrongdoing).
Not surprisingly then, the UAE scores poorly in a leading index of money-laundering risk—worse, in fact, than several notoriously shady sunny places, including the Seychelles (see chart 4). That score and its size together make Dubai the biggest single hole in the global anti-money-laundering (AML) system, say some experts. The UAE’s finance ministry and central bank declined to comment.
Much of the dodgy cash goes into luxury flats and villas. A leak of property records in 2016 revealed 800 Dubai properties, worth $400m, linked to over 300 Nigerian “politically exposed persons” (current or former officials, their relatives or associates). Another channel is Dubai’s 30 or so free zones. Though economically important, some hubs are opaque and, investigators and anti-corruption NGOs suspect, misused by money-rinsers.
Corporate malfeasance is not restricted to secretive shell companies or trading firms. Thanks to weak governance and a culture of self-dealing, the UAE has more than its fair share of once-high-flying companies that were felled by financial scandals—among them Abraaj, once the Middle East’s top private-equity firm, and NMC Health, a company once included in the FTSE 100, Britain’s stockmarket index.
公司不法行为不仅限于隐秘的空壳公司或交易公司。由于治理薄弱和内部交易的文化,阿联酋有太多曾盛极一时但最终因金融丑闻而垮台的公司,其中包括曾是中东顶级私募股权公司的Abraaj,以及曾被纳入英国富时100指数的NMC Health。
Dubai’s weaknesses in combating illicit finance are “a feature, not a bug” of its political economy, as a recent report by the Carnegie Endowment, a think-tank, puts it. When international rules designed to root out tax evaders took effect a few years ago, the UAE offered inveterate dodgers ways to invest in its companies and property that circumvented the rules (it tightened up after the EU cried foul).
迪拜在打击非法金融方面的薄弱是其政治经济体制的“特征而非漏洞”,智库卡内基基金会(Carnegie Endowment)最近的一份报告指出。几年前,当旨在揪出逃税者的国际税务法规生效时,阿联酋向避税老手提供了在投资迪拜公司和物业时绕过新规的方法(在欧盟强烈抗议后有所收紧)。
Another sign of this is Dubai’s lack of co-operation with foreign governments probing suspected corruption with Dubai links. According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which writes and polices global AML standards, between 2013 and 2018 Dubai’s public prosecutor received around 300 such “mutual legal assistance” requests, but acted on only 89 of them.
Sanctuary for sanctions-busters One reason Dubai has got away with such foot-dragging is that it has been shrewd, for instance by paying lip service to reform at moments of international scrutiny, then doing nothing much when the pressure eases. Another reason is its strategic importance: the UAE is a key ally for Western powers. As a result, the FATF, over which those powers hold great sway, has pulled its punches.
There are signs the tide is starting to turn. The FATF issued a (by its standards) stinging report on the UAE earlier this year, and reportedly placed it under year-long observation to ensure that it implements recently passed AML laws. If it does not, it could be added to the FATF’s “grey list”, joining the likes of Syria and Zimbabwe. That is one naughty-step away from blacklisting, which would, in effect, require international banks to disengage.
It almost certainly will not come to that. Dubai’s rulers may seem impervious to international criticism, but “will act very quickly” to weed out the dodgiest business if Dubai’s financial links are threatened, says a well-connected Emirati financier.
They are, he adds, also confident they can secure new sources of revenue if cleaning up cuts off business. He also notes that, as long as the UAE remains stable and its region volatile, it will benefit from capital flight. The Arab spring was high season for Dubai’s deposit-takers. Now they are doing brisk business with clients from Lebanon.
Other new business takes more effort. The UAE’s political and business leaders have worked tirelessly over the past couple of years to strengthen links with China, signing deals in logistics, chemicals, finance and more. Not for them the moral high ground or bans on Huawei. They are beginning to reap the benefits. The DIFC is the regional headquarters for China’s four largest banks as well as several big firms. Though the UAE is not a key player in China’s Belt and Road initiative, Dubai is becoming the hub of choice for Chinese expansionism in the region. Ever ambitious, the DIFC has talked of tripling in size by 2030. Its burgeoning eastern connections make that seem a little less fanciful.