Navigating the storm 风暴中航行

2020.9


Can the Middle East’s largest financial centre adapt to a world that is less globalised and less tolerant of tainted money?
中东最大的金融中心能否适应一个不那么全球化也不那么容忍脏钱的世界?

 

风暴中航行


THE DEAL to normalise relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), announced on August 13th, was a diplomatic coup. Might it be a commercial one too? Moneymen in Dubai, the UAE’s largest financial centre, are hoping to cash in on increased investment and travel between the two countries. Israelis are expected to join the hordes of well-heeled foreigners who have opened businesses or bought swanky pads in the coastal emirate.
以色列与阿联酋关系正常化的协议于8月13日公布,这是外交上的重大突破。在商业上会不会也一样呢?阿联酋最大的金融中心迪拜的金融家希望从两国之间不断增加的投资和往来中获利。预计以色列人将和其他大批富有的外国人一样,在这个沿海酋长国开办企业或购买豪华公寓。 Dubai, one of seven emirates that make up the UAE, will be glad of the custom. Its media may be full of feel-good financial stories—drooling, for instance, over the recent foundation-pouring for the world’s tallest hotel, set to rise to 82 storeys, and the unveiling of “the world’s highest infinity pool”—but closer to earth things look less impressive. Thanks to overbuilding, property prices remain far below peaks reached six years ago. Covid-19 has clobbered an economy built largely on retail and hospitality. Low oil prices have strengthened the headwinds: Dubai is not hydrocarbon-rich but its economy feeds on petrodollars.
组成阿联酋的七个酋长国之一的迪拜会为他们的光顾而高兴。其媒体可能会充斥让人感觉良好的财经报道,例如赞叹将有82层楼的全球最高酒店近期完成了桩基灌注、“世界上最高的无边际泳池”揭幕等。但在离地面更近的地方,景观就没那么亮眼了。由于过度建设,房地产价格仍远低于六年前的峰值。新冠疫情重创了主要依靠零售和酒店服务业的经济。低油价又雪上加霜:迪拜的石油储量并不丰富,但其经济依赖石油美元。
Adding to the challenges, Dubai faces increasing international pressure to clean up its act. It has long been less than discerning about the provenance of money flowing in. Its property market is heavily stained with laundered loot. If Dubai is forced to tighten standards, that would dent business in the short term, complicating its efforts to push its way into the premier league of financial centres.
除了这些挑战,迪拜还面临着国际社会日益要求它“端正行为”的压力。长期以来,迪拜一直没有严格甄别流入资金的来源。它的房地产市场脏钱汇聚。如果迪拜被迫收紧标准,短期内将影响其生意,让它争取跻身顶级金融中心行列的努力复杂化。
Viewed over a longer timeline, Dubai’s growth has been spectacular. In the 1950s, as the City of London was about to ride the Eurodollar boom, Dubai was little more than a fishing village, with 20,000 souls and no airport. Today it is a metropolis. Its financial centre, which first began to take off in the 1990s, is a super-regional champion, serving as a gateway for investment from and to the Middle East, South Asia and Africa. Underpinning this is its stable polity and high quality of life: it offers the region’s ritziest penthouses, finest dining and best shopping and entertainment.
回顾更久远的过去,迪拜实现了惊人的增长。上世纪50年代,伦敦金融城即将迎来欧元热潮,而迪拜差不多只是个渔村,人口两万,没有机场。如今它已发展成一个大都市。自上世纪90年代开始腾飞的迪拜金融中心是一个超级区域领头羊,是投资进出中东、南亚和非洲的门户。稳定的政体和高品质的生活支撑了这种地位:迪拜拥有该地区最豪华的顶层公寓、最高档的餐厅,还有最好的购物和娱乐场所。
Strong trade and transport links support its financial offering. The city has the world’s largest man-made harbour and the Middle East’s busiest port, with enough space for 22.4m twenty-foot containers. Its airport is—or was, at least, until the pandemic—a key east-west transit point. In 2019 it was the world’s busiest airport for international passengers. Dubai is, in short, the closest thing its region has to a Singapore- or Hong Kong-style entrepot.
迪拜四通八达的贸易和运输支持了金融服务的发展。这个城市拥有世界上最大的人工港口和中东最繁忙的港口,可容纳2240万个标准集装箱。它的机场是(至少在疫情发生前一直都是)东西方关键枢纽。2019年,它以国际客运量计是全球最繁忙的机场。简而言之,迪拜在该地区最像新加坡或香港的中转港。
According to the Global Financial Centres Index, which since 2007 has ranked cities according to a range of financial, economic and quality-of-life measures, Dubai has steadily closed the gap with the top tier (see chart 1). It now hovers just outside the top ten. The next highest Middle Eastern centre is Tel Aviv in 36th place, followed by Abu Dhabi, the capital of another emirate (and the UAE) in 39th.
根据自2007年起用金融、经济和生活质量一系列指标给城市排名的全球金融中心指数(Global Financial Centres Index),迪拜一直在稳步缩小与全球顶尖金融中心的差距(见图表1)。如今它已经在前十的门口徘徊了。中东排名第二高的金融中心特拉维夫位列第36位,在它之后另一个酋长国的首府(同时也是阿联酋的首都)阿布扎比排名第39位。
The heart of Dubai’s financial ecosystem is the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), a 110-acre “free zone” in the city centre set up in 2004 to boost Dubai as both financial waystation and investment destination. The DIFC has grown into an impressive cluster of banks, fund managers, and law and accounting firms, with over 2,500 registered companies—820 of them financial—and 25,000 professionals.
迪拜金融生态系统的心脏是迪拜国际金融中心(Dubai International Financial Centre,以下简称DIFC),这个在市中心占地110英亩的“自由区”建于2004年,目标是推动迪拜成为金融中转站和投资目的地。DIFC的发展令人瞩目,聚集了银行、基金管理公司、律师和会计师事务所,有2500多家注册公司(其中820家为金融公司)和2.5万名专业人士。
The DIFC says it hosts 17 of the world’s top 20 banks; eight of the ten leading global law firms; and six of the ten biggest asset managers. Many of them have their regional headquarters there. The banks have around $180bn of assets booked there; DIFC firms arranged an additional $99bn of lending last year. Some specialise in trade finance and infrastructure lending. The DIFC’s fund managers have assets of $424bn. Its financial firms are restricted to foreign-currency transactions. Some Dubai-based banks have operations in the zone too, but conduct dirham-denominated business from branches outside it.
据DIFC称,全球20大银行中的17家、十大律师事务所中的八家、十大资产管理公司中的六家都已进驻。其中许多都把地区总部设在这里。银行在DIFC约有1800亿美元的账面资产;DIFC企业安排的贷款去年增加了990亿美元。有些公司专门从事贸易融资和基础设施贷款。DIFC的基金管理公司管理着4240亿美元的资产。金融公司在DIFC仅可从事外币交易。迪拜的一些银行也在自由区内经营,但是以阿联酋货币迪拉姆计价的业务仍通过自由区之外的分支机构进行。
The DIFC’s appeal lies largely in its bespoke tax regime and regulation. Like the other 40-odd free zones in the UAE, it sets its own rules. It is tax-light, allows foreigners full ownership (outside zones this is capped at 49%) and sets no local-hiring quotas. It has its own regulator, the Dubai Financial Services Authority, run by a former bank supervisor for America’s Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Financial firms outside free zones fall under the central bank and other national authorities.
DIFC的吸引力主要在于其特定的税收制度和法规。和阿联酋其他40多个自由区一样,它自行设定规则。这里税率低,允许外商拥有百分之百的所有权(自由区之外的外资持股上限为49%),并且不设置雇用本地员工的比例。它有自己的监管机构——迪拜金融服务管理局(Dubai Financial Services Authority),由美国货币监理署(Office of the Comptroller of the Currency)的一名前银行监管人掌管。自由区外的金融公司则由央行和其他国家主管部门监管。
The DIFC has its own judicial system too, based on common law and with courts that hear cases in English. (By contrast, the UAE’s system is based on civil law.) The DIFC passes its own laws: one on data protection, based on EU regulations, took effect on July 1st.
DIFC还运行以普通法系为基础的独立司法体系,法院用英语审理案件。(而阿联酋是大陆法系。)DIFC自己立法,一项基于欧盟法规的数据保护法规于7月1日生效。
This autonomy is prized especially by investors whose home countries’ legal systems are less dependable. Indians flock to it because of Mumbai’s clogged, clunky and capricious courts; some joke that Dubai and Singapore are India’s real financial capitals. In a big boost, Dubai’s judgments became enforceable in India in January.
本国法律制度不那么可靠的投资者尤其看重这种自主性。印度人之所以蜂拥而至,就是因为孟买的法院案件堆积,效率低下,反复无常。有人开玩笑说迪拜和新加坡才是印度真正的金融之都。迪拜的判决自今年1月起可在印度强制执行,这是一大助力。
The DIFC’s judicial system has grown quickly. In 2019 its courts heard a record 952 commercial cases, 43% more than in 2018. It has a growing reputation as a regional arbitration centre, helped by a joint venture with the London Court of International Arbitration, and the hiring of judges from Australia, Britain and elsewhere.
DIFC的司法体系发展迅速。2019年,其法院审理了创纪录的952起商事案件,比2018年增加了43%。DIFC与伦敦国际仲裁法院(London Court of International Arbitration)合作成立了仲裁院,并从澳大利亚、英国等地聘请法官,推动DIFC作为区域仲裁中心的声誉不断提高。
The DIFC has navigated the coronavirus crisis well. It even managed to sign up 310 new companies in the first half of 2020—a six-month record. This followed a record year in 2019, in which 493 new companies joined, among them an insurance arm of Berkshire Hathaway and the asset-management division of State Street.
截至目前DIFC很好地扛过了新冠疫情。2020年上半年它甚至成功签约了310家新公司,创下了六个月入驻数的新纪录。2019年已经是创纪录的一年,当时有493家新公司入驻,其中包括伯克希尔•哈撒韦(Berkshire Hathaway)旗下的保险公司和道富银行(State Street)的资产管理公司。
This unlikely growth was, the DIFC says, largely driven by interest from Asian firms and fintechs. Having invested heavily to launch a fintech “accelerator”, Dubai claims to be home to over half of all fintechs in the Middle East and North Africa. The January-June registration numbers were probably helped by a speedily assembled relief package for DIFC clients, unveiled in March, including licensing-fee waivers, lease-payment deferrals as well as three-month rent forgiveness for retailers.
DIFC表示,这种不可思议的增长主要源于这里吸引到了亚洲企业和金融科技公司的兴趣。迪拜已投入巨资启动了一个金融科技“加速器”,它声称这里已经汇集了中东和北非一半以上的金融科技公司。1月至6月有那么多新公司注册,可能是得益于3月对DIFC客户快速推出的刺激计划,其中包括免许可费、延期支付租金,以及对零售商免收三个月租金。
Still, covid-19 has taken a heavy toll on Dubai. It is more vulnerable than the region’s other economies because of its reliance on retail and recreation, both highly susceptible to physical-distancing and travel restrictions, says Ehsan Khoman, head of Middle East research at MUFG, a bank. Its equity market has fallen further than others in the Gulf this year (see chart 2).
但疫情毕竟还是给迪拜带来了严重损失。三菱日联金融集团(MUFG)中东研究负责人埃桑•霍曼(Ehsan Khoman)表示,迪拜依赖极易受社交疏离和旅行限制影响的零售和休闲娱乐业,因此比该地区的其他经济体更容易受到冲击。今年,迪拜股票市场的跌幅超过了海湾地区的其他市场(见图表2)。 
Moreover, Dubai was struggling to shake off several pre-existing conditions when the virus struck. A debt and building binge had left it exposed during the financial crisis of 2007-09. It took a $10bn bail-out by Abu Dhabi to stave off the threat of sovereign default. But Dubai’s “government-related entities” (GREs)—conglomerates with tentacles across the economy, such as Dubai World (from ports to leisure) and Dubai Holding (telecoms, property and more)—remain heavily burdened, and there is talk of another debt crisis. Capital Economics, a consultancy, reckons total public debt is $153bn, of which GREs owe $89bn, equivalent to 140% and 81% of GDP respectively. Their repayment schedule is gruelling, with over 60% of their debt due in the next four years. They had topped up their borrowing to fund projects ahead of the World Expo, which had been scheduled for October, hoping for a flurry of deals and up to 25m visitors. But the event has been pushed back a year because of covid-19.
此外,新冠病毒来袭时,迪拜正在努力摆脱一些原有的问题。先前的一轮借贷和建设狂潮让它在2007至2009年金融危机来袭时遭受重创,靠阿布扎比提供的100亿美元援助才渡过了主权债务违约的危机。但是,触角延伸至迪拜经济的各个方面、被称为“政府相关实体”(GRE)的企业集团仍然背负沉重债务,例如迪拜世界(Dubai World,业务横跨港口、休闲业等)和迪拜控股(Dubai Holding,业务包括电信、房地产等)。人们议论着又一次债务危机的可能性。咨询公司凯投宏观(Capital Economics)估计,迪拜的公共债务总计为1530亿美元,其中GRE的债务为890亿美元,分别相当于GDP的140%和81%。偿还期限紧迫,超过60%的债务将在未来四年到期。为了在原定于10月举行的世博会之前为项目提供资金,迪拜追加了贷款,本来希望世博会能达成一系列协议并吸引多达2500万游客。但由于疫情爆发,世博会被推迟一年。
Dubai’s property market, too, was in pain well before the pandemic because of oversupply. Residential property prices have fallen in recent years, as have occupancy rates at hotels (see chart 3). The number of visitors to Dubai from elsewhere in the Gulf fell by 10% between 2016 and 2019. Developers were cutting back before the virus; now some fear for their survival. In July S&P, a rating agency, downgraded the debt of two of Dubai’s biggest property companies to junk. It also expects the economy to shrink by 11% this year.
迪拜的房地产市场也因为供过于求而早在疫情之前很久就已经水深火热。近年来,住宅价格下降,酒店入住率也在下滑(见图表3)。2016年至2019年间,从海湾地区的其他地方到访迪拜的游客数量下降了10%。开发商在疫情之前就已经在后撤,现在有些公司担心自己活不下去。7月,评级机构标准普尔将迪拜两家最大的房地产公司的债务评级降至垃圾级。它还预计今年迪拜的经济将萎缩11%。 
As it seeks to shake off these ailments and recover from the effects of its covid-induced lockdown (which was among the world’s strictest), Dubai faces longer-term challenges. One is the slowing and possible reversal of globalisation as trade tensions rise and populist policies spread. Having redesigned its economy around the flow of people, goods and capital, Dubai was a big beneficiary of globalisation, and used its strategic location to punch above its weight. Now the model looks like a vulnerability. (The consequences are not clear-cut, though. Entrepots sometimes benefit when big powers squabble, as dealmaking moves to neutral ground. And if global trade turns more parochial, then regional hubs like Dubai could pick up some types of business even as they lose others.)
迪拜试图摆脱这些弊病,并从疫情导致的封锁措施(是世界上最严格的之一)的影响中恢复过来,与此同时它还面临着长期挑战。一是随着贸易紧张局势的加剧和民粹主义政策的扩散,全球化正在放缓并可能逆转。迪拜围绕人员、货物和资本的流动重新设计了经济结构,是全球化的一大受益者,并利用其战略位置实现了超常发展。现在,这样的发展模式看起来成了软肋。(不过后果尚不明确。由于大国相争时交易活动会转至中立国,中转港地区有时会受益。而且,如果全球贸易变得更地区化,迪拜等区域枢纽在失去一些业务的同时可能会收获另一些类型的业务。)
Protracted weakness in the oil price could also cause problems. Oil-related activities make up just 1% of Dubai’s nominal GDP, according to MUFG. Still, its prospects are entwined with oil-price fluctuations. A lot of the finance in Dubai involves reinvesting oil money from the region. Its property boom was largely built on regional petrodollars. And many of its tourists come from oilier Gulf countries.
石油价格长期疲软也可能引发问题。三菱日联金融集团称,与石油有关的经济活动仅占迪拜名义GDP的1%。但迪拜的经济前景仍与油价波动紧密交织。迪拜的很多资金都来自该地区石油资金的再投资。它的房地产热潮主要是靠海湾地区石油美元的推动。它的许多游客也都来自石油储量更多的海湾国家。
Another question is whether Dubai can stay ahead of regional rivals that covet its crown. Oil-rich Abu Dhabi, a 90-minute drive away, is a frenemy: it is both a source of bail-outs and a would-be usurper. It attracts a smattering of foreign investment managers, keen to work with its sovereign-wealth fund, the UAE’s biggest. But its financial district is not a patch on the DIFC.
另一个问题是迪拜能否保持住被区域内竞争对手觊觎的领先地位。石油资源丰富的阿布扎比距迪拜仅90分钟车程,亦敌亦友:它既是纾困资金的来源,又是潜在的篡位者。阿布扎比吸引了少量外国投资管理公司,这些公司渴望与它的主权财富基金(在阿联酋规模最大)合作。但阿布扎比的金融区远不及DIFC。
Riyadh could prove a more serious competitor, especially if Saudi Arabia’s social liberalisation continues and attracts more fun-loving expats. The completion of the 59-tower King Abdullah Financial District, a banking hub in the Saudi capital, has taken on more urgency under Muhammad bin Salman, the country’s crown prince. Hints have been dropped that foreign banks that open an outpost there may be better placed to win Saudi mandates, says one banker.
利雅得可能会是一个更有力的竞争者,尤其是如果沙特阿拉伯社会能继续自由化进程、吸引到更多爱玩乐的外国人的话。沙特首都的银行业中心阿卜杜拉国王金融区(King Abdullah Financial District)将有59栋高楼,在王储穆罕默德•本•萨勒曼(Muhammad bin Salman)的领导下其落成变得更加急迫。沙特已经给出暗示,在那里开设分行的外国银行可能更容易得到政府授权项目,一位银行人士说。
The biggest long-term threat, however, comes from within: Dubai’s attitude to corrupt capital. Of all the big global financial centres, it is the shadiest—not only a haven for clean money seeking investments or fleeing turmoil elsewhere, but also for the dirty stuff. It is used by kleptocrats, money-launderers, arms-smugglers, sanctions-busters and other criminals. The UAE and Iran are the only Gulf countries on America’s list of “major money-laundering jurisdictions”; its moneymen are under scrutiny for suspected financial ties to Syria’s president and his cronies. And it doesn’t just take the bad guys’ money; a flock of fugitives, alleged fraudsters and disgraced public figures live in Dubai, including a suspect in the massive “cum-ex” tax-fraud case (who denies wrongdoing).
然而,最大的长期威胁来自内部,即迪拜对待不法资金的态度。在所有大型全球金融中心中,迪拜是最见不得光的,它不仅是合法资金寻求投资或逃离别处动荡的安全港,也是脏钱的庇护所。腐败官僚、洗钱者、军火走私商、违反制裁者和其他不法分子都会利用迪拜来处理资金。阿联酋和伊朗是美国“主要洗钱管辖区”名单中仅有的海湾国家;由于涉嫌与叙利亚总统及其亲信有财务往来,阿联酋的金融人士正受到审查。而且,迪拜不仅是资金的窝藏地,还有大量逃犯、欺诈嫌疑人和名誉扫地的公众人物生活在那里,其中包括涉案金额巨大的“cum-ex”税务欺诈案的一个嫌疑人(他否认有不法行为)。
Not surprisingly then, the UAE scores poorly in a leading index of money-laundering risk—worse, in fact, than several notoriously shady sunny places, including the Seychelles (see chart 4). That score and its size together make Dubai the biggest single hole in the global anti-money-laundering (AML) system, say some experts. The UAE’s finance ministry and central bank declined to comment.
因此毫不出奇,阿联酋在一个主要的洗钱风险指数中得分很低。实际上,它比包括塞舌尔在内的几个阳光灿烂却臭名昭著的地方得分还低(见图表4)。一些专家说,这样的低分加上自身的规模使迪拜成为全球反洗钱系统中最大的一个漏洞。对此,阿联酋财政部和央行拒绝置评。 
Much of the dodgy cash goes into luxury flats and villas. A leak of property records in 2016 revealed 800 Dubai properties, worth $400m, linked to over 300 Nigerian “politically exposed persons” (current or former officials, their relatives or associates). Another channel is Dubai’s 30 or so free zones. Though economically important, some hubs are opaque and, investigators and anti-corruption NGOs suspect, misused by money-rinsers.
大部分来路不明的现金都流向了豪华公寓和别墅。2016年流出的房产记录显示,迪拜价值四亿美元的800处房产与300多个尼日利亚“政治敏感人物”(现任或前任官员、他们的亲属或同事下属)有关联。不法资金的另一个流向是迪拜的约30个自由区。尽管这些中心在经济上很重要,它们中有一些的运作不透明,调查人员和反腐败非政府组织怀疑它们被洗钱者滥用。
Corporate malfeasance is not restricted to secretive shell companies or trading firms. Thanks to weak governance and a culture of self-dealing, the UAE has more than its fair share of once-high-flying companies that were felled by financial scandals—among them Abraaj, once the Middle East’s top private-equity firm, and NMC Health, a company once included in the FTSE 100, Britain’s stockmarket index.
公司不法行为不仅限于隐秘的空壳公司或交易公司。由于治理薄弱和内部交易的文化,阿联酋有太多曾盛极一时但最终因金融丑闻而垮台的公司,其中包括曾是中东顶级私募股权公司的Abraaj,以及曾被纳入英国富时100指数的NMC Health。
Dubai’s weaknesses in combating illicit finance are “a feature, not a bug” of its political economy, as a recent report by the Carnegie Endowment, a think-tank, puts it. When international rules designed to root out tax evaders took effect a few years ago, the UAE offered inveterate dodgers ways to invest in its companies and property that circumvented the rules (it tightened up after the EU cried foul).
迪拜在打击非法金融方面的薄弱是其政治经济体制的“特征而非漏洞”,智库卡内基基金会(Carnegie Endowment)最近的一份报告指出。几年前,当旨在揪出逃税者的国际税务法规生效时,阿联酋向避税老手提供了在投资迪拜公司和物业时绕过新规的方法(在欧盟强烈抗议后有所收紧)。
Another sign of this is Dubai’s lack of co-operation with foreign governments probing suspected corruption with Dubai links. According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which writes and polices global AML standards, between 2013 and 2018 Dubai’s public prosecutor received around 300 such “mutual legal assistance” requests, but acted on only 89 of them.
这种特征的另一个表现是当外国政府调查与迪拜有关的涉腐案件时,迪拜不够合作。根据制定和监管全球反洗钱标准的金融行动特别工作组(FATF)的数据,迪拜的检察机关在2013年至2018年间收到了约300个此类“司法互助”的请求,但仅对其中89个采取了行动。
Sanctuary for sanctions-busters One reason Dubai has got away with such foot-dragging is that it has been shrewd, for instance by paying lip service to reform at moments of international scrutiny, then doing nothing much when the pressure eases. Another reason is its strategic importance: the UAE is a key ally for Western powers. As a result, the FATF, over which those powers hold great sway, has pulled its punches.
迪拜拖延不改却不被追究,一个原因是它很精明,比如在国际社会聚焦之际口头许诺改革,但在压力缓解之后又无所作为。另一个原因是它的重要战略地位:阿联酋是西方强国的重要盟友。因此,受这些国家支配的FATF一直对迪拜手下留情。
There are signs the tide is starting to turn. The FATF issued a (by its standards) stinging report on the UAE earlier this year, and reportedly placed it under year-long observation to ensure that it implements recently passed AML laws. If it does not, it could be added to the FATF’s “grey list”, joining the likes of Syria and Zimbabwe. That is one naughty-step away from blacklisting, which would, in effect, require international banks to disengage.
有迹象表明趋势开始逆转。FATF今年早些时候发布了一份(按其自身标准来说)措辞严厉的报告,并据说将对迪拜观察一年,以确保它切实执行近年通过的反洗钱法律。如不执行,它可能会被列入FATF的“灰名单”,与叙利亚和津巴布韦等国同列。灰名单与黑名单仅一步之遥,它实际上会要求国际银行从当地退出。
It almost certainly will not come to that. Dubai’s rulers may seem impervious to international criticism, but “will act very quickly” to weed out the dodgiest business if Dubai’s financial links are threatened, says a well-connected Emirati financier.
几乎可以肯定事情最终不会走到这个地步。迪拜的统治者看似对国际批评无动于衷,但如果迪拜的金融连接受到威胁,他们“将很快采取行动”清除最见不得光的业务,一位人脉广阔的阿联酋金融家表示。
They are, he adds, also confident they can secure new sources of revenue if cleaning up cuts off business. He also notes that, as long as the UAE remains stable and its region volatile, it will benefit from capital flight. The Arab spring was high season for Dubai’s deposit-takers. Now they are doing brisk business with clients from Lebanon.
他补充说,如果清理市场中断了某些业务,他们也有信心可以获得新的收入来源。他还指出,只要阿联酋保持稳定而海湾地区继续动荡,它就会从资本外逃中受益。阿拉伯之春让迪拜收获了大量存款。现在,这里与黎巴嫩的客户之间生意繁忙。
Other new business takes more effort. The UAE’s political and business leaders have worked tirelessly over the past couple of years to strengthen links with China, signing deals in logistics, chemicals, finance and more. Not for them the moral high ground or bans on Huawei. They are beginning to reap the benefits. The DIFC is the regional headquarters for China’s four largest banks as well as several big firms. Though the UAE is not a key player in China’s Belt and Road initiative, Dubai is becoming the hub of choice for Chinese expansionism in the region. Ever ambitious, the DIFC has talked of tripling in size by 2030. Its burgeoning eastern connections make that seem a little less fanciful.
有些新业务需要费更多力气。过去两三年里,阿联酋的政商领袖不懈地加强与中国的联系,在物流、化工、金融等领域签署了一系列协议。他们才不管道德高地或华为禁令。如今他们开始收获回报。DIFC是中国的四大行以及几家大公司的地区总部。尽管阿联酋不是中国“一带一路”倡议的主要参与者,但迪拜正在成为中国扩张主义在该地区的首选枢纽。一贯雄心勃勃的DIFC大谈在2030年前将自身规模扩大两倍。它与东方迅速发展的联系让这个目标看起来不那么不切实际了。